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This Article presents a mixed-methods study of
misdemeanor bail practice across Georgia in the wake of
reform. We observed bail hearings and interviewed
system actors in a representative sample of fifty-five
counties to assess the extent to which pretrial practice
conforms to legal standards clarified in Senate Bill 407
and Walker v. Calhoun. We also analyzed jail
population data published by county jails and by the
Georgia Department of Community Affairs. We found
that a handful of counties have made promising
headway in adhering to law and best practices, but that
the majority have some distance to go. Most counties
assessed do not assure a bail hearing within forty-eight
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hours of arrest, provide counsel at the initial bail
hearing, consistently evaluate arrestees’ financial
circumstances, or guarantee release within forty-eight
hours of arrest for those who cannot pay bail. In a
combined eighteen counties, 37% of misdemeanor
arrestees remained in jail for at least three days after
arrest. In DeKalb County, 53% of all those arrested on
misdemeanor charges between 2000 and 2019 were
jailed for three days or more, but the annual rate has
declined from 63% in 2009 to 26.5% in 2019. Per capita
pretrial detention rates varied widely by county in 2019,
with most of the higher rates in the southern portion of
the state. Overall, the qualitative and quantitative data
demonstrate both progress and substantial variation by
county.
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“To make a real impact . . . there has to be a deeper commitment to
equity and not just doing things that will make for a good headline.”
–Jill Cartwright, Southerners on New Ground1
I. INTRODUCTION
Georgia, like jurisdictions across the nation, is undertaking bail
reform.2 In the past two years, the state legislature3 and local
federal courts4 have issued guidance regarding the post-arrest
treatment of people accused of misdemeanors. In the face of a status
quo yielding unnecessary wealth-based pretrial detention,
activists,5 elected officials,6 judges,7 and lawyers8 have worked to
1 Aaron Morrison, Atlanta Bail Reform Is Leaving Behind Homeless and Mentally Ill
People, APPEAL (May 16, 2019), https://cutt.ly/PryL46r.
2 See, e.g., COLIN DOYLE, CHIRAAG BAINS & BROOK HOPKINS, HARVARD LAW SCH., BAIL
REFORM 5 (Feb. 2019), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/BailReform_WEB.pdf (listing
jurisdictions that the authors consider “Pioneers of Reform” in this area, as well as
jurisdictions that have made “[r]ecent [c]hanges” with “[p]romising [o]utcomes”).
3 See Act effective July 1, 2018, 2018 Ga. Laws 550 (2018) (providing guidelines on
determining bail for those charged with misdemeanors); Atlanta, Ga. Ordinance No. 18-O1045 (Feb. 6, 2018) (eliminating the requirement of a cash bond for release in certain
circumstances).
4 See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that
the City of Calhoun’s “Standing Bail Order” did “not trigger heightened scrutiny under the
Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence”); see also Mock v. Glynn, No. 18-cv-0025,
2019 WL 2847122, at *1 (S.D. Ga. July 2, 2019) (providing an overview of when post-arrest
treatment infringes constitutional rights).
5 See, e.g., Richard Fausset, Bail Was $500, Money He Didn’t Have. Atlanta Faces Calls
for Change, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://cutt.ly/3ryGFYS (discussing the role of
grassroots organizations like Southerners on New Ground); Gabrielle Hernandez, How
Southern Organizers Are Leading the Movement to End Money Bail, SCALAWAG (May 17,
2018), https://cutt.ly/IryGAaM (discussing the actions of Southerners on New Ground, a
“queer Southern grassroots organizing coup”).
6 See, e.g., Rhonda Cook, Atlanta Mayor Signs New Ordinance Changing Cash Bail
System in a Nod to the Needy, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/atlanta-council-oks-changes-cash-bail-system-nod-theneedy/SW50dABJAtWgBwpB4vtgBN/ (discussing how the cash bail ordinance was signed
and approved by the City Council “with a unanimous vote”); Emma Hurt, Deal Signs Bail
Reform Bill, Closing Out Criminal Justice Reform Campaign, WABE (May 7, 2018),
https://www.wabe.org/governor-signs-bail-reform-bill/ (discussing Governor Nathan Deal’s
signing of a “bail reform bill” as “one of the final parts of his criminal justice reform
campaign”).
7 See, e.g., Georgia Supreme Court Justice Appointed to Lead National Criminal Justice
Board, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS JUST. CTR. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://cutt.ly/RryHK0t (“State
officials across the U.S. have used the findings and technical assistance provided by the CSG
Justice Center to develop legislative findings.”).
8 See,
e.g.,
Challenging
the
Money
Bail
System,
C.R.
CORPS,
https://www.civilrightscorps.org/work/wealth-based-detention (last visited Mar. 17, 2020)
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highlight the harms caused by prevalent and long-standing local
bail practices. Yet a crucial question remains to be answered: Have
these reforms taken hold where they matter most, in jails and
courthouses throughout the state?
This Article assesses the state of misdemeanor bail practice in
Georgia in the wake of reform. We deployed research assistants to
watch misdemeanor bail hearings in jurisdictions around the state,
interviewed judicial system actors in jurisdictions where we could
not observe hearings, and synthesized publicly available data from
jail websites. On the whole, the results of the survey suggest that
reforms are not being closely followed—not a single studied county
adhered to all legal requirements tested. Several counties studied,
however, have made promising headway.
To our knowledge, this study represents the first academic effort
to assess bail practice on the ground across an entire state in the
current era of bail reform. The reason, as we have learned, is that
the diversity of local criminal justice systems makes such
qualitative research extremely difficult. Yet, for the same reason,
such research is all the more important. We hope that future efforts
will improve on ours.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II describes why and how
a bail reform movement has taken shape across the country. Part
III outlines Georgia’s recent legislative and judicial developments
on misdemeanor bail practice. Part IV documents our research
methodologies and findings. Part V, finally, considers the
implications of these findings and offers recommendations for
concerned stakeholders. The Article ultimately calls for further
attention to the unglamorous but critical next chapter of bail reform
work: implementation on the ground. Until the developments
championed as “reform” are realized by the thousands of Georgians
who face arrest and accusation each year, the work is not over.
II. THE IMPETUS FOR BAIL REFORM
For decades, jails and prisons across the country have treated the
rich and the poor differently in the period immediately following

(“Our work has freed tens of thousands of people from jail cells . . . and is setting precedent
that will forever change the bail-setting process in the United States.”); Fausset, supra note
5 (discussing the role of a lawyer working for the Southern Center for Human Rights).
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arrest.9 At any given moment, close to half a million people are
incarcerated in America’s jails and prisons pending trial.10 In
Georgia, recent estimates indicate that over fifty-six percent of the
state’s jail population on any given day—21,121 of the 37,456
total—are awaiting trial.11 In many instances, this pretrial
detention stems from an inability to pay a sum of money, commonly
referred to as a “secured bond,”12 in order to facilitate one’s
freedom.13 Those unable to come up with the money remain in jail,
awaiting minimal further process,14 public defenders who may
never come,15 and a remote trial date.16 Many people plead guilty,
9 See, e.g., DOYLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1 (describing how “[t]he practice of making the
payment of a money bond a requirement for pretrial release discriminates based on wealth”).
10 Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://cutt.ly/YryFzfq.
11 VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION TRENDS IN GEORGIA 1 (Dec. 2019),
https://cutt.ly/7ryL2Dn (providing figures from 2015).
12 “Secured bonds” represent collateral posted as a precondition of release from jail. See,
e.g., HARVARD LAW SCH., MOVING BEYOND MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 6 (Oct. 2016),
http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/FINAL-Primer-on-Bail-Reform.pdf (explaining that “[a]
secured bond typically allows a defendant to be released only after he pays the monetary
amount set by the court”). Secured bonds can be forfeited if the accused fails to appear for a
court appearance and a court deems forfeiture appropriate. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 17-6-70
(2020) (explaining when a bond forfeiture is appropriate). “Unsecured bonds” represent an
amount of collateral due in the event of a failure to appear, but payment is not a precondition
to release from jail. See, e.g., HARVARD LAW SCH., supra, at 6 (“When bond is unsecured, the
defendant will owe the unsecured bond amount if he fails to appear in court.”).
13 See, e.g., MARIE VAN NOSTRAND, NEW JERSEY JAIL POPULATION ANALYSIS: IDENTIFYING
OPPORTUNITIES TO SAFELY AND RESPONSIBLY REDUCE THE JAIL POPULATION 14 (Mar. 2013),
https://cutt.ly/6ryFOHp (documenting that nearly 75% of New Jersey jail inmates were
pretrial, including 12% because they could not post bail of $2,500 or less).
14 See, e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-cv-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612, at *1
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016) (“Plaintiff has asked officers at the Jail when he will go to court, and
has received three different answers. Defendant holds weekly court sessions on Mondays, and
new arrestees who cannot post bond must wait until the following Monday to see the judge.”
(internal citation omitted)), vacated, 682 F. App’x 721 (11th Cir. 2017); ODonnell v. Harris
Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 153–54 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The district court noted that the
statutorily-mandated probable cause hearing (where bail is usually set) frequently does not
occur within 24 hours of arrest. The hearings often last seconds, and rarely more than a few
minutes. Arrestees are instructed not to speak, and are not offered any opportunity to submit
evidence of relative ability to post bond at the scheduled amount.”).
15 See Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2161–62 (2013); see also STEPHEN B. BRIGHT, S.
CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PROMISES TO KEEP: ACHIEVING FAIRNESS AND EQUAL JUSTICE FOR
THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES 8 (Nov. 2000), https://cutt.ly/eryJi48 (reporting that indigent
arrestees in Georgia often wait “weeks or months” before a public defender sees them in jail).
16 Georgia law requires that criminal defendants who demand a speedy trial be tried
within two terms in which a jury is available. See O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170 (2011). In many
jurisdictions, juries may only be impaneled once or twice per year. See, e.g., Fleming v. State,
240 S.E.2d 37, 39 (Ga. 1977) (noting that juries are impaneled only in January and
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regardless of valid defenses, simply to end the ordeal of
incarceration.17
The human and economic toll of these practices is massive. Those
unable to afford money bail face the dangers and difficulties of jail,18
are more likely to be convicted,19 and are more likely to face longer
sentences.20 Even two days of pretrial incarceration may yield
negative collateral consequences, such as an increased likelihood of
recidivism21 or failure to appear.22 Those who must pay secured
money bail, particularly those who depend on a commercial bail
company to do so, often experience long-term economic setbacks.23
Meanwhile, taxpayers foot the bill for the housing, food, and medical
care of those held in jail.

September); Treadwell v. State, 211 S.E.2d 760, 761 (Ga. 1975) (finding that a period of
twenty-seven months’ incarceration did not violate speedy trial right); see also Dorothy T.
Beasley, The Georgia Bill of Rights: Dead or Alive?, 34 EMORY L.J. 341, 356 (1985) (noting
that, notwithstanding the long clock under state law, Georgia courts evaluating speedy trial
challenges employ the even less protective federal speedy trial right articulated under Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)).
17 Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 747 (2017) (finding detained arrestees
25% more likely than similarly situated persons to plead guilty). For a comparison of the
pressures of criminal incarceration and the separation of parents from their children at the
U.S. border, see Somil Trivedi, The Family Separation Crisis Exposes America’s Addiction to
Incarceration, HILL (June 30, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://cutt.ly/TryXGwo.
18 Ned Parker et al., Death and Politics Roil a Georgia Jail, REUTERS (Sept. 4, 2019, 6:00
PM), https://cutt.ly/vryXZUP (discussing prevalence of deaths, suicides, and lack of medical
treatment in Chatham County Detention Center).
19 MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., A DECADE OF BAIL
RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 116 (Aug. 2012), https://cutt.ly/MryX2sK (noting the conviction
rate for nonfelonies is approximately 50% for those released immediately, and 92% for those
detained until the conclusion of their case).
20 Heaton et al., supra note 17, at 717 (noting that, compared to those similarly situated,
those detained pretrial are 43% more likely to be sentenced to a term of incarceration, and,
when sentenced, to serve nine additional days on average).
21 CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL
DETENTION 3, 22 (Nov. 2013), https://cutt.ly/LryX7Uw (highlighting that, when controlling
by assessed risk level, persons incarcerated for two or three days pretrial have higher rates
of arrest both during the pretrial period and longer term compared to those released within
a day).
22 See id. at 10 (controlling by risk level, persons incarcerated for two or three days have
higher failure to appear rates than persons released within a day).
23 See, e.g., BRIAN HIGHSMITH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., COMMERCIALIZED (IN)JUSTICE:
CONSUMER ABUSES IN THE BAIL AND CORRECTIONS INDUSTRY 26 (Mar. 2019),
https://cutt.ly/DrGgXBL (describing the standard commercial bail practice of requiring
nonrefundable deposits regardless of case outcome, and that $16 to $27 million is extracted
from incarcerated people and their support networks in a single year in New York alone in
such deposits).
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In light of these human and economic costs, our nation has
experienced several waves of pretrial reform. The first occurred in
the 1960s. In 1964, then-United States Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy commented on the state of the American bail system,
noting: “[O]nly one factor determines whether a defendant stays in
jail before trial. . . . That factor is simply money.”24 Kennedy
stressed that such a system was both “cruel” and “illogical.”25 In
1961, the Vera Institute for Justice and NYU School of Law
launched the Manhattan Bail Project, which demonstrated the
efficacy of release on recognizance rather than secured money bail,
spurring a broader conversation about the role of money bail.26 And
in 1966, the U.S. Congress passed the Bail Reform Act, which
required that all persons accused of non-capital federal crimes be
released pretrial, with a presumption that any conditions on their
release be non-financial.27
In the 1980s, another bail reform movement took hold. This
second push was more concerned with public safety, and culminated
in the passage of the 1984 federal Bail Reform Act—still in use—
authorizing increased pretrial detention in the federal system.28 The
Act embraced detention based on dangerousness, which was
extremely controversial at the time.29 In upholding the 1984 Act, the
U.S. Supreme Court stressed the significant limiting processes it
mandated prior to any individual order of pretrial detention, and
affirmed the principle that “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited
exception.”30
We are now in the midst of a new wave of bail reform, focused,
like the first one, on the inequalities and harms imposed by money

24 Kennedy Scores Bail Injustices; Changes in System Urged by the Attorney General, N.Y.
TIMES (May 30, 1964), https://www.nytimes.com/1964/05/30/archives/kennedy-scores-bailinjustices-changes-in-system-urged-by-the.html.
25 Id.
26 Marion C. Katzive, New Areas for Bail Reform: A Report on the Manhattan Bail
Reevaluation Project 3 (Working Paper, 1968), https://cutt.ly/jryCjb3.
27 See United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 170–71 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (discussing the
1966 Bail Reform Act).
28 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2018).
29 See, e.g., Ann M. Overlook, Detention for the Dangerous: The Bail Reform Act of 1984,
55 U. CINN. L. REV. 153, 154–55 n.7 (1988) (noting the legal shift was “significant”).
30 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
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bail. States like New Jersey31 and New Mexico32 have overhauled
post-arrest procedures to increase release, improve due process, and
ensure that failure to appear (FTA) and pretrial rearrest rates
remain low. Activists33 and grass-roots community organizations34
are posting bail for those unable to pay on their own, generally with
great success,35 demonstrating that secured bail requirements often
inflict needless harm. Further, a wave of lawsuits raising due
process and equal protection challenges to money-bail systems that
frequently result in pretrial incarceration has reinforced the
principle that pretrial freedom should only be infringed in the most
serious of circumstances.36
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN GEORGIA
Georgia, too, has undertaken bail reform. In the past four years,
two federal lawsuits challenged post-arrest treatment of low-income
Georgians under local money bail systems.37 One of those suits,
Walker v. Calhoun, resulted in a precedential decision from the

31 See Criminal Justice Reform Information Center, N.J. CTS., https://cutt.ly/qrGhgL5 (last
visited Mar. 17, 2020) (providing a comprehensive overview of New Jersey’s amended bail
reform system, including pretrial services and reports documenting data from years of
implementation).
32 See, e.g., Key Facts and Law Regarding Pretrial Release and Detention, N.M.
LEGISLATURE, https://cutt.ly/grGhmW4 (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (describing constitutional
amendment and guidance from New Mexico Supreme Court overhauling money bail system).
33 See, e.g., Black Mama’s Bail Outs, NAT’L BAIL OUT, https://cutt.ly/mroKfsp (last visited
Mar. 17, 2020) (annual campaign to bail out Black mothers before Mother’s Day).
34 See, e.g., NASHVILLE CMTY. BAIL FUND, https://nashvillebailfund.org/ (last visited Mar.
17, 2020).
35 See, e.g., Our Results, BROOKLYN CMTY. BAIL FUND, https://cutt.ly/JrZeiyf (last visited
Mar. 17, 2020).
36 See, e.g., Dixon v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:19-cv-0113-AGF, 2019 WL 2437026, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. June 11, 2019) (articulating plaintiff’s claims of an unconstitutional pre-trial bail
process), vacated, 950 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2020); Buffin v. City & Cty. of S.F., No. 15-cv-04959YGR, 2019 WL 1017537, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019) (noting claims the bail schedule used
by the city was unconstitutional); McNeil v. Cmty. Prob. Servs., LLC, No. 1:18-cv-00033, 2019
WL 633012, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 14, 2019) (examining plaintiff’s alleged Fourteenth
Amendment violation claims); Schultz v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1362–63 (N.D. Ala.
2018) (indicating one of the issues in the case was the plaintiff’s pretrial liberty and freedom);
ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1058 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (discussing claims of
due process and equal protection violations in setting a bail amount), aff’d as modified, 892
F.3d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 2018).
37 See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018); Mock v. Glynn, No. 18cv-0025, 2019 WL 2847122 (S.D. Ga. July 2, 2019).
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Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.38 In February 2018, the Atlanta
City Council voted to eliminate cash bail in many municipal cases.39
And in 2017 and early 2018, a statewide task force convened by
then-Governor Nathan Deal studied and issued formal
recommendations for misdemeanor bail reform.40 This process
resulted in legislation, Senate Bill 407 (SB 407), that the legislature
signed into law on May 7, 2018.41 Taken together, SB 407 and
Walker mandate speedy and adequate process for people accused of
misdemeanors to ensure that no one languishes in jail due to limited
economic means.42
A. AMENDMENTS TO THE GEORGIA CODE

SB 407 made several changes to the provisions of the Georgia
Code governing bail in misdemeanor cases. It first authorized law
enforcement to issue citations in lieu of arresting a person for a
number of misdemeanors.43 It also amended the provision governing
the bail-setting process. Prior to SB 407, Georgia law already
included an absolute right to bail in misdemeanor cases.44 SB 407
amended the Code to clarify that all but the most serious charges
“are bailable by a court of inquiry,” including ordinance violations.45
The bill further amended the statute to guide bail-setting courts
more explicitly:
When determining bail for a person charged with a
misdemeanor, courts shall not impose excessive bail

38 See generally Walker, 901 F.3d 1245 (contributing to the creation of standards for
post-arrest procedures in misdemeanor cases).
39 News Release: Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms Signs Cash Bond Ordinance into Law, CITY
ATLANTA NEWS LIST (Feb. 6, 2018), https://cutt.ly/MroHIwW (informing the Mayor of Atlanta
signed the City Council’s ordinance into law).
40 See generally REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL AD HOC COMMITTEE ON MISDEMEANOR
BAIL REFORM (2018) [hereinafter AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT] (discussing recommendations
after a committee investigation into bail reform).
41 S.B. 407, 154th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Ga. 2018).
42 See infra Sections III.A–B.
43 See Ga. S.B. 407 (outlining situations where it is appropriate for a law enforcement
officer to issue citations); see also O.C.G.A. § 17-4-23(a)(2) (2018) (allowing the issuance of
citations instead of arrest in certain circumstances).
44 O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(b)(1) (2018) (providing that “at no time . . . shall any person charged
with a misdemeanor be refused bail.”). The only exceptions, in subsection (g), apply to appeal
bonds. Id. § 17-6-1(g).
45 Id. § 17-6-1(b)(1).

1246

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1235

and shall impose only the conditions reasonably
necessary to ensure such person attends court
appearances and to protect the safety of any person or
the public given the circumstances of the alleged offense
and the totality of circumstances.46
Most significantly, SB 407 amended the statute to require that
judges in all cases evaluate an arrestee’s financial circumstances in
setting bail “as soon as possible.”47 The financial inquiry requires
courts to consider: “(A) The accused’s financial resources and other
assets, including whether any such assets are jointly controlled; (B)
[t]he accused’s earnings and other income; (C) [t]he accused’s
financial obligations, including obligations to dependents; (D) [t]he
purpose of bail; and (E) [a]ny other factor the court deems
appropriate.”48 Nothing in the revised statute prevents judges from
setting unaffordable bail—and thus functionally detaining the
person subject to the bail requirement—for any reason. Further, SB
407 preserved the right of jurisdictions as a matter of state law to
establish bail schedules—charts providing pre-determined bail
amounts, usually based solely on charge.49 Pursuant to Walker,
however, federal constitutional law constrains both practices.50
B. WALKER V. CALHOUN

Walker challenged the constitutionality of the misdemeanor bail
system in Calhoun, Georgia. Maurice Walker, a fifty-four-year-old
man experiencing a mental health disability, was arrested for being
a pedestrian under the influence of alcohol51 and held in jail on a
$160 cash bond requirement.52 Mr. Walker’s monthly income was
$530 in disability benefits; neither he nor his family could afford the
bail in his case.53 After five days’ incarceration without access to
Id.
Id. § 17-6-1(e)(2). The temporal limitation “as soon as possible” is not defined elsewhere
in the statute.
48 Id.
49 Id. § 17-6-1(f)(1).
50 See generally Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding
limitations on bail within the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution).
51 See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-95 (2020).
52 See Walker, 901 F.3d at 1251.
53 Id.
46
47
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medication for his mental health disorder, Mr. Walker filed a
federal class action lawsuit.54 The next day, he was released.55
After Mr. Walker filed his case, the City of Calhoun amended its
bail policies by issuing a “Standing Bail Order.”56 Under the
Standing Bail Order, misdemeanor arrestees could pay a preset bail
amount (determined by a “schedule” of offenses and corresponding
bail amounts) and obtain immediate release, whereas those unable
to pay the preset amount were provided a post-arrest hearing to
evaluate their indigency within forty-eight hours of arrest.57 Public
defenders were available at the hearings to assist those otherwise
unrepresented in advocating for pretrial release.58 Under the
revised practices, indigent persons who previously would have
stayed in jail due to their inability to afford a bail requirement were
guaranteed release within forty-eight hours of arrest because they
received a hearing assuring bail would be set in an affordable
amount.59
Notwithstanding the revised policy, the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia issued a preliminary injunction in
the class action.60 Relying on Bearden v. Georgia,61 the court held
that even two days of detention for inability to pay a preset bail
amount violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment.62 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
remanded the case because the injunction was impermissibly broad
(Walker I).63 The district court accordingly issued a more specific
injunction.64 It commended Calhoun’s policy changes but again held
that the incarceration of those unable to pay a sum of money for
forty-eight hours, where those able to pay were released

Id. at 1251–52.
Id. at 1252.
56 Id. at 1252–53.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1252–53, 1262, 1266 n.12.
60 Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612, at *14 (N.D. Ga.
Jan. 28, 2016), vacated, 682 Fed. App’x 721 (11th Cir. 2017).
61 461 U.S. 660, 661 (1982).
62 Walker, 2016 WL 361612, at *14.
63 Walker v. City of Calhoun, 682 Fed. App’x 721, 725 (11th Cir. 2017).
64 Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2017 WL 2794064, at *4–5 (N.D.
Ga. June 16, 2017), vacated, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018).
54
55
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immediately, violates the Fourteenth Amendment.65 The City of
Calhoun appealed.
The central question on appeal was whether the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited the City of Calhoun from conditioning
pretrial liberty on wealth for a period of forty-eight hours.66 It was
undisputed on appeal that Calhoun’s revised procedures
guaranteed release to indigent persons within forty-eight hours of
arrest.67 The City also made defense counsel available at its release
hearings.68 The question was whether the Calhoun violated due
process and equal protection by allowing people with resources to
obtain immediate release while those without resources had to wait
up to two days for an individualized hearing.
In an opinion authored by Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid
O’Scannlain,69 the Eleventh Circuit sided with the City (Walker II).
It held that Calhoun’s revised system of pretrial release for
misdemeanor defendants satisfied the U.S. Constitution.70 It
therefore vacated the second injunction and remanded the case.71
In holding for the city, however, the Eleventh Circuit
simultaneously affirmed federal constitutional constraints on bail
practice. First, the Walker II court affirmed that the Fourteenth
Amendment principles from Bearden72 and Pugh v. Rainwater73
apply to detention on unaffordable bail, rejecting the notion that
claims like Walker’s must be analyzed under the Eighth
Amendment’s excessive bail clause.74 Walker II also accepted that a
“total deprivation” of pretrial liberty triggers heightened scrutiny.75
The court found that Calhoun’s Standing Bail Order did not permit
a “total deprivation” of pretrial liberty for indigent persons,
however, because it guaranteed release from custody within

Id. at *3.
Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1266 (11th Cir. 2018).
67 Id. at 1263, 1265. The court noted that preventive detention was not being imposed in
“any form,” even de facto detention on money bail, because of this guarantee of release. See
id. at 1263.
68 Id. at 1252.
69 Judge O’Scannlain was sitting by designation. Id. at 1250 n.*.
70 Id. at 1269. Judge Beverly Martin dissented from this holding. See id. at 1274–77
(Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71 Id. at 1272 (majority opinion).
72 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
73 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978).
74 Walker, 901 F.3d at 1260.
75 Id. at 1261.
65
66
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forty-eight hours.76 The majority deemed forty-eight hours’
incarceration to be merely a diminishment of pretrial liberty, not an
“absolute deprivation,”77 and thus did not apply heightened scrutiny
to Walker’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.78 Instead, it analyzed
the claim pursuant to the “traditional due process rubric” of
Mathews v. Eldridge.79 In doing so, Walker II stressed that pretrial
bail determinations in Calhoun were individualized and never
resulted in incarceration for more than forty-eight hours.80
C. THE STATE OF THE LAW

Walker II may not be the final word on the federal constitutional
requirements for bail-setting. There is reason to think that the U.S.
Supreme Court might ultimately interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment to impose even more stringent constraints than the
Eleventh Circuit did. To begin with, other federal courts to evaluate
similar claims have applied a heightened standard of review rather
than the traditional due process balancing test.81 As a matter of
substantive due process, moreover, the government must generally
satisfy heightened scrutiny before depriving a person of liberty
without a trial.82 (Mr. Walker did not raise a substantive due
Id. at 1261–63, 1265.
Id. at 1261. This holding is based solely on the hybrid equal protection/due process
claim, stemming from Bearden, that was before the Walker II court. The court did not rule on
the required protections and procedures under substantive due process before the
government imposes forty-eight hours of incarceration, as the question was not before it.
78 Id. at 1262.
79 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Walker, 901 F.3d at 1265. A small number of courts have
subsequently referred to the analysis undertaken by the Walker II court as rational basis
review, in error. See, e.g., McNeil v. Cmty. Prob. Servs., No. 1:18-cv-00033, 2019 WL 633012,
at *12 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 14, 2019) (order granting preliminary injunction); Schultz v. State,
330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1361, 1365 n.23 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (order granting preliminary
injunction); Edwards v. Cofield, No. 3:17-CV-321-WKW, 2018 WL 4101511, at *1 (M.D. Ala.
Aug. 28, 2018) (order denying motion for reconsideration).
80 Walker, 901 F.3d at 1252.
81 See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 162 (5th Cir. 2018); Buffin v. City &
Cty. of S.F., No. 15-cv-04959-YGR, 2019 WL 1017537, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019); Dixon
v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:19-cv-0113-AGF, 2019 WL 2437026, at *14 (E.D. Mo. June 11, 2019);
McNeil, 2019 WL 633012, at *13.
82 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“[T]his Court has said that government
detention violates [the Due Process Clause] unless . . . in certain special and ‘narrow’
nonpunitive ‘circumstances,’ . . . where a special justification, such as harm-threatening
mental illness, outweighs the ‘individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding
physical restraint.’” (first quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); and then
quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997))); ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 162
76
77
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process claim83). Finally, courts evaluating the constitutionality of
wealth-based pretrial detention post-Walker II have distinguished
the facts at issue from those in Walker; not all jurisdictions provide
the same protections and release guarantee as the City of
Calhoun.84
For the moment, however, the state of misdemeanor bail law in
Georgia is as follows. Pursuant to Georgia’s amended bail statute
and the federal constitutional principles outlined in Walker II, all
courts setting misdemeanor bail requirements must inquire into the
ability of a given arrestee to pay any bond amount, including
evaluating any debts and whether the individual has dependents.85
Further, under Walker II, any system that imposes secured bail
requirements immediately upon arrest must likely evaluate an
individual’s ability to pay within forty-eight hours.86 Finally, under
Walker II, a local jurisdiction cannot confidently avoid a finding that
it “totally deprives” indigent arrestees of pretrial liberty if it does
not provide indigent defense counsel to re-evaluate bail

(“[I]ndigents receive a heightened scrutiny where two conditions are met: (1) ‘because of their
impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit,’ and (2) ‘as a
consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy
that benefit.’” (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973)));
Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2014) (“If there was any doubt about
the level of scrutiny applied in Salerno, it has been resolved in subsequent Supreme Court
decisions, which have confirmed that Salerno involved a fundamental liberty interest and
applied heightened scrutiny.” (first citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993); and
then citing Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80–83)); see also Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th
Cir. 1978) (“We view such deprivation of liberty of one who is accused but not convicted of
crime as presenting a question having broader effects and constitutional implications than
would appear from a rule stated solely for the protection of indigents.”).
83 Complaint at 12–13, Walker v. Calhoun, 2017 WL 2794064 (N.D. Ga. June 6, 2017) (No.
4:15-cv-00170-HLM).
84 See, e.g., McNeil, 2019 WL 633012, at *3; Schultz, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 1352–53, 1361;
Buffin, 2019 WL 1017537, at *3. A second appeal of a case involving the Fourteenth
Amendment rights of pretrial arrestees is pending in the Eleventh Circuit as of the time of
publication of this Article. See Schultz v. Alabama, No. 5:17-CV-00270-MHH, 2018 WL
4253645 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 5, 2018), appeal docketed sub nom. Hester v. Gentry, No. 18-13894
(11th Cir. Sept. 13, 2018).
85 See O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(e)(2) (2018).
86 See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1266 (11th Cir. 2018). As amended, state
law requires that these evaluations occur “as soon as possible,” and it is well established that
“delay for delay’s sake” is unacceptable. See Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56
(1991); see also Buffin, 2019 WL 1017537, at *18 (noting that City and County of San
Francisco appeared to have been “unjustifiably taking advantage of the 48-hour window” by
not taking plaintiff to earlier available hearing dates).
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determinations and ultimately guarantee release within forty-eight
hours of arrest.87
IV. EVALUATING FIDELITY TO THE GEORGIA CODE AND WALKER II
ACROSS THE STATE
A. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

In order to examine how closely local courts are following the
guidance of Georgia’s amended bail statute and Walker II, we
crafted a research study using a stratified random sample of
Georgia counties. For each county, we sought to answer the
following questions regarding misdemeanor bail process:
(1) When bail is set, does the decisionmaker consider the
arrestee’s ability to pay? If so, does that consideration include
inquiry into resources, assets, earning/income, obligations,
and obligations to dependents?88
(2) Does the jurisdiction hold hearings to determine indigency
and evaluate bail within forty-eight hours of arrest?89
(3) Does the jurisdiction guarantee release within forty-eight
hours of arrest?90
(4) Does the jurisdiction provide public defense counsel when
bail is set?91
Georgia’s highly decentralized court system presented a
significant challenge for this research. The state has 159 counties
(more than any other state except Texas),92 which are divided into
ten “judicial districts.”93 Almost every judicial district contains a

See Walker, 901 F.3d at 1266.
This is required by O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(e)(2) (2018).
89 This is the timeframe deemed “presumptively constitutional” by Walker, 901 F.3d at
1266. Further, O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(e)(2), as amended by SB 407, requires a bail-setting inquiry
evaluating finances occur “as soon as possible.” See S.B. 407, 154th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess.
(Ga. 2018).
90 The City of Calhoun, evaluated in Walker, did. See 901 F.3d at 1252–53, 1263, 1266
n.12.
91 The City of Calhoun, evaluated in Walker, did. See id. at 1252, 1265, 1269.
92 See
Georgia
Judicial
System
Structure,
REFORMGEORGIA,
https://www.reformgeorgia.org/georgia-judicial-system-structure/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2020)
(explaining Georgia’s 159 counties are “second only to Texas”).
93 Id.
87
88
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number of “judicial circuits.”94 Most of the judicial circuits each
contain several counties.95 Other than the Judicial Qualifications
Commission, which is responsible for fielding complaints of judicial
misconduct, there is no entity charged with oversight of the courts
and implementation of state law or federal constitutional standards
in the courts.96 This extreme fragmentation makes it difficult to
study statewide practices.
Given the impossibility of conducting research in all 159 counties
during the timeframe for this project, we selected a representative
sample of fifty-one counties for study.97 County targets were
randomly selected based on judicial district. Where possible, six
counties were selected from each judicial district (two districts
contain fewer than six counties). These six targets included three
densely populated counties98 and three less densely populated
counties.99 Between the Fourth (Stone Mountain) and Fifth
(Atlanta) Judicial Districts there are only three combined
counties,100 so each of those three counties were included in the
study.101 If a county ultimately presented insurmountable barriers
to data collection, we excluded it from the sample. We did one round
of random replacement for counties that presented initial barriers
94 See id. (“Georgia’s 49 judicial circuits then divide into the ten (10) state judicial
districts.”).
95 See id. (depicting the composition of counties, judicial circuits, and judicial districts).
96 See GA. JUD. QUALIFICATIONS COMMISSION, https://gajqc.com/home (last visited Mar. 17,
2020) (explaining that the purpose of the Judicial Qualifications Commission is to “conduct
investigations and hearings with respect to complaints of ethical misconduct by Georgia
judges”).
97 See infra Part VII.
98 Defined as counties with an above-median population density—measured by people per
square mile in the 2010 Census—for that district. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEORGIA: 2010
CENSUS
OF
POPULATION
AND
HOUSING
17–42
tbl.8
(Aug.
2010),
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2010/cph-2/cph-2-12.pdf (listing the
counties in Georgia and their respective population densities).
99 Defined as counties with a below-median population density—measured by people per
square mile in the 2010 Census—for that district. Id. In some judicial districts (2nd, 8th, 9th,
10th), a single county represented the “median” in terms of population density and was
omitted as neither over or under the median. Id.
100 Due to this variation in the number of counties per judicial district (ranging from a
single county in the 5th Judicial District to twenty-seven counties in the 2nd and 8th Judicial
Districts), counties from judicial districts with fewer total counties are over-representative.
See infra Part VIII.
101 Due to this variation in the number of counties per judicial district (ranging from a
single county in the 5th Judicial District to twenty-seven counties in the 2nd and 8th Judicial
Districts), counties from judicial districts with fewer total counties are over-representative.
See infra Part VIII.
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to court watching, but due to time constraints were not able to fully
replace all counties where court watching was not feasible.
In an effort to gain the best information possible, we utilized a
tiered methodology to answer the four research questions in each
county selected. As a priority method, the study authors and
volunteer researchers observed misdemeanor bail hearings and
interviewed court actors.102 Following each hearing or interview, the
researcher documented her observations in a uniform
court-watching form that we provided. We collated these
observations and requested or conducted follow-up research as
necessary. Court watching was ultimately achieved in thirteen
counties.103
While the researchers made their best efforts to observe hearings
in person, it was not always possible due to scheduling constraints,
a lack of predictable hearings in some counties, and the geographic
range of target sites. Where court watching was not possible, we
pursued alternative research methods, including reviewing public
records and interviewing local actors with an interview guide.
Terminology also varies widely across Georgia’s many counties. It
was sometimes difficult to pinpoint the relevant court session, as
the first time a misdemeanor arrestee is able to speak with a judicial
officer about bail could be labeled an “initial appearance,” “first
appearance,” “recorder’s court,” or “rights read” proceeding.104 As
described in Section I.E, therefore, the findings described below
represent an assessment conducted to the best of our ability given
the nature and limitations of the data collection process. A copy of
materials collected from each county is on file with the authors and
available upon request.
We were ultimately able to answer all four research questions
for thirty-three counties.105 In an additional seventeen counties, we
were able to determine answers to some but not all of our research
questions.106 This generally occurred because the interviewee
contacted was unsure of certain details, or researchers were able to

102 We relied especially on law students from Georgia State University, University of
Georgia, Emory University, and Mercer University, as well as undergraduate students from
the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga.
103 See infra Part VIII.
104 See infra Part IX.
105 See infra Part VIII.
106 See infra Part VIII.
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obtain only basic information about local court scheduling
practices.107
In addition to the qualitative study of misdemeanor bail practice,
we conducted a separate analysis of jail data to identify high-level
trends in misdemeanor pretrial detention. We created an original
data set by scraping daily information from county jail registries
where available online.108 The selection process for this second
study was based on availability: sixty-two of Georgia’s 159 counties
publish jail registries online and of those sixty-two, we selected
twenty sites. Appendix C describes the methodology for this portion
of the study in more detail. We also analyzed data published by
Georgia’s Department of Community Affairs in its Monthly Jail
Reports series, as described further in Appendix D.
B. RESULTS

Overall, the results of both components of the study were
sobering. Not a single county studied satisfied all four criteria
examined. Of the four, judges’ evaluation of ability to pay when
considering bail at the first hearing after arrest had the strongest
showing, with 48.65% of studied counties providing some ability-topay inquiry. There was wide variation, however, in the rigor of the
inquiry. Only three counties have systems in place that guarantee
release for indigent persons who cannot pay bail within forty-eight
hours of arrest, and only five provide counsel when bail is initially
evaluated. The following Table presents our results at a glance.

107 Even preliminary information about bail setting and court schedules enabled us in some
circumstances to answer research questions two and three: if a county never holds hearings
to evaluate misdemeanor bail, or does so on a regular schedule less frequently than every
forty-eight hours, the authors could infer that hearings were not assured within forty-eight
hours of arrest, nor release guaranteed for anyone unable to pay the bail requirement set in
their case.
108 Students from the North Oconee High School Beta Club, directed by Dr. Paige Cole and
Richard Rosch, assisted with this process.
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Table 1. Court-Watching / Survey Results.

Relevant
sample
% Yes

Court
makes
ATP
finding
37
48.65%

Hearing
always
held w/in
48 hours
46

Counsel
provided
at initial
hearing
42

41.30%

11.90%

Release
guaranteed
w/in 48
hours
49
8.16%

The jail data, meanwhile, revealed that 53% of all misdemeanor
defendants booked into the DeKalb County jail between 2000 and
2019 spent more than three days in jail (emphatically
demonstrating that there is no guarantee of release within
forty-eight hours of arrest for those unable to post bond). Among the
eighteen additional counties for which we evaluated 2019 jail data,
the proportion of misdemeanor arrestees who spent more than three
days in jail was approximately 37%. The average number of pretrial
detainees per thousand residents on any given day in 2019 ranged
from zero, in many small and rural counties, to more than five in
others.
Although the results suggest that, on the whole, Georgia courts
are not adhering closely to either state or federal law, a handful of
counties appear to be headed in the right direction. Many judges,
sheriffs and court administrators are aware of recent legal
developments and are making serious efforts to eliminate
unnecessary detention. On the whole, however, even those
promising jurisdictions need to either (1) provide their post-arrest
process more quickly and/or (2) take the ability-to-pay inquiry one
step further to assure release for those who have not been able to
post bail by the time of a hearing. Ultimately, more work is needed
by both local and statewide actors to ensure compliance with the
new baseline presented by O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1 and Walker, and then
to look towards best practices.
The rest of this Section presents our results in more detail.
Because the intent is for this research to provide a picture of
statewide practice and a framework for further improvement, the
authors do not report results for individual counties from
court-watching or interviews. Detailed information, including notes
from research volunteers, is available upon request.
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1. Research Question One: When Bail Is Set, Does the
Judge/Decisionmaker Consider the Arrestee’s Ability to Pay?
Arguably, a mandate that judges evaluating bail consider an
arrestee’s ability to pay is the clearest principle coming out of the
amended Georgia Code and Walker. It was also the one adhered to
most often: eighteen of the thirty-seven counties in which we could
answer this research question undertake some inquiry into
individual finances when a judge first evaluates bail.109 This
constitutes 48.65% of the sample.
There was, however, considerable variation within the ability-topay inquiries provided. The financial evaluation ranged from formal
financial affidavits gathering information about income and assets
as well as debts, expenses, and dependents110 to informal
evaluations, sometimes based on the judge or sheriff’s personal
familiarity with the accused and their circumstances.111
Researchers could only confirm that two counties undertook the full
financial evaluation required by O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(e)(2) by covering
income/assets, obligations/debts, and obligations to dependents.112
2. Research Question Two: Does the Jurisdiction Hold Hearings
to Determine Indigency and Evaluate Bail Within Forty-Eight Hours
of Arrest?
Of the forty-six counties for which this question could be
answered, nineteen (41.30%) provided hearings to evaluate bail for
those unable to afford an initial bail (or who had not received bail)
within forty-eight hours of arrest. Interestingly, a higher proportion
of those nineteen counties, twelve of them, were among the lower

109 In many counties, bail is initially “set” according to a pre-set secured bond schedule, and
those who can post the bond are released immediately, either directly from the stationhouse
or quickly after they have been booked into jail. It is only those who cannot make the bond
who receive a hearing before a judicial officer. See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245,
1252–53 (11th Cir. 2018) (describing a system of this kind). In counties that use such systems,
our inquiry focused on the hearing process for those who had not made the initial, pre-set
bond.
110 The authors identified four counties where financial affidavits were in use, and they
were not uniform. For examples, see infra Part XI.
111 This appears to be the case in three counties studied.
112 A handful of counties came close but were missing one component of the required
financial inquiry. Three of the counties studied evaluate income/assets and dependents but
not debts. Another county inquires into income, dependents, and disability but not
debts/obligations.
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density counties in the study sample. The other seven were among
the higher density counties. There does not, therefore, appear to be
a correlation with the more rural counties struggling to provide
hearings in a timely manner, as twelve of them met the forty-eighthour mark, some providing hearings no longer than twenty-four
hours after arrest. Many counties113 studied adhere to the initial
appearance
hearing
requirements
for
probable
cause
determinations prescribed under state law: that those arrested
without a warrant appear within forty-eight hours and those
arrested on a warrant appear within seventy-two hours of arrest.114
However, as a matter of federal due process, it is questionable
whether a period of seventy-two hours of incarceration on
unaffordable bail would pass muster: Walker II held only that a
ceiling of forty-eight hours of such incarceration was presumptively
constitutional.
3. Research Question Three: Does the Jurisdiction “Guarantee
Release” Within Forty-Eight Hours of Arrest?
Based on the study, only four counties’ practices suggest that
release is “guaranteed” for misdemeanor arrestees who cannot pay
bail within forty-eight hours of their arrest. This constitutes 8.16%
of the counties for which research question three could be answered.
A handful of other counties115 appeared to guarantee release for
most, if not all, defendants, but practical constraints meant that the
release did not always occur within forty-eight hours. For example,
one county observed ensures that virtually all misdemeanor
arrestees are released after their first appearance, but when
interviewed, the judges indicated there may be rare circumstances
in which a misdemeanor arrestee’s bond remains in an amount he
or she cannot afford due to public safety concerns. Further, that
same jurisdiction does not hold hearings on weekends, so even with
its general practice of lowering bail or ordering recognizance release
113 Representatives from seven counties explicitly indicated that they adhered to the
seventy-two-hour rule, and it is likely that many others do as well.
114 See O.C.G.A. § 17-4-62 (2020).
115 Two more counties indicated that they provide a guarantee of release within forty-eight
hours for traffic charges: any arrestee still in custody on a pending traffic citation forty-eight
hours after arrest is automatically released on a recognizance bond. Four additional
interviewees indicated that judges in their county had a positive attitude towards working
with individuals who cannot afford their bond to get them out, but it was difficult to tell on
what timeframe this happened and whether that process only began after securing counsel.

1258

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1235

at bail hearings, an arrestee is not guaranteed freedom within
forty-eight hours due to the hearing schedule. Similarly, practices
observed in another jurisdiction came close to a guarantee of release
within forty-eight hours, because most misdemeanor arrestees are
released on their own recognizance, but initial appearances are
scheduled within seventy-two hours of arrests on a warrant, thus
falling short of the forty-eight-hour mark. A third county provides
hearings on Fridays to reduce bond and evaluate conditions of
release for anyone who has not been able to afford their bond; if
these hearings were held within forty-eight hours of each
individual’s arrest rather than weekly, the guarantee could likely
be shown.
The counties that ensure release within forty-eight hours or come
close were the exception rather than the rule. Numerous counties
indicated that they do not provide hearings to evaluate bail, leaving
arrestees to navigate their initial bail requirement without judicial
process. Others do so irregularly, or only every few weeks. Even
counties that provide regular post-arrest hearings to consider bail
do not consistently operate with a guarantee of release for those
unable to pay their misdemeanor bonds—either because the court
does not inquire into finances, or because the court imposes or
maintains unaffordable financial conditions regardless of an
inquiry.116
4. Research Question Four: Does the Jurisdiction Provide Counsel
to Assist with a Bail Evaluation when an Arrestee First Appears in
Court After Arrest?
Of the forty-two counties for which this question could be
answered, only five (11.9%) provided appointed counsel at initial
hearings to evaluate or reevaluate misdemeanor bail. Of these five,
only two had a population density of under 288 people per square
mile: the other three were more populous.117 While a handful of
other counties indicated that arrested persons often apply for
116 Unaffordable bail is set routinely across the state and was directly observed or
documented in seventeen counties studied. Based on the limited process available, the
authors suspect unaffordable bail is also commonly imposed in at least seven more
identifiable counties.
117 This is consistent with other observations about the availability of legal resources in
more rural jurisdictions. See generally Lisa R. Pruitt et al., Legal Deserts: A Multi-State
Perspective on Rural Access to Justice, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15 (2018) (providing similar
observations about the availability of legal resources in rural jurisdictions).
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appointed or public defense counsel, and later seek bond reductions
through counsel, this does not mirror the speed (forty-eight hours)
or coverage (representation for all incarcerated at the time of initial
bail hearings) endorsed by Walker.
5. Trends from Publicly Available Jail Data.
Jail data confirm the sobering overall results of the
court-watching and interview survey. We report the results of the
jail-data analysis briefly here.118
Among the eighteen counties for which we tracked jail-inmate
registries from May to November 2019,119 36.72% of those arrested
on new misdemeanor charges only, with no other holds, spent three
days or more days in jail. The average jail time was 8.7 days. The
rate of detention for three days or more ranged from a low of 11% in
one county to 80% in another. In fourteen counties, at least 20% of
those arrested on new misdemeanor charges without other holds
spent at least three days in jail. These figures indicate that many
people are incarcerated for longer than forty-eight hours after arrest
on misdemeanor charges in Georgia.
It is also notable, however, that the median jail time in these
eighteen counties was two days. This is likely due to another subset
of the population being able to afford bail quickly and securing
release within the first few hours of arrest. Although a shorter
median detention period is a good thing, it highlights the disparity
that a money-bail system produces between those who are able to
immediately secure release and those who are not.
DeKalb County’s jail records also reveal alarming rates of
detention for more than three days. From 2000 through 2019, more
than half of the 212,091 people booked on new misdemeanor charges
without other holds—112,340 individuals, or 53%—spent three
days or more in jail. The average jail stay for this group was 11.23
days. The median jail stay, on the other hand, was 3.16 days.
Further, it was possible to evaluate DeKalb arrestees based on the
group of people who bonded out with a cash bond or commercial
bondsman. These jail stays were much shorter than the population
at large: those who bonded out were jailed a median of thirty-six
hours (less than half the median for the entire population). This
suggests, perhaps intuitively, that those with the resources to pay
118
119

Appendices C and D provide additional detail. See infra Parts IX–X.
This dataset includes 2,750 individual cases.
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bail or hire a bondsman secure their release much faster than those
who cannot.
The good news is that the percentage of people jailed for more
than three days after misdemeanor arrest in DeKalb County seems
to be on the decline. In 2009, 63.11% were incarcerated for three
days or more, in 2015 the figure dropped to 39.75%, and in 2019 the
figure was 26.5%. While a quarter of people charged solely with new
misdemeanors is still a high proportion to be incarcerated for three
or more days, DeKalb County appears to be making substantial
progress.120
Figure 1: DeKalb Misdemeanor Arrestees Held in Jail 3 Days or
More.
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Using the Monthly Jail Reports published by the Georgia
Department of Community Affairs,121 we also calculated the
average pretrial detention rate per capita for each Georgia county
during 2019 (including those detained on felony as well as
misdemeanor charges). We report this rate as the number of pretrial
120 Although it is tangential to our study, we also note that between 2000 and 2019, 80.27%
of misdemeanor arrestees in the DeKalb jail were Black, whereas only 54.17% of the county’s
population identified as Black on the 2010 Census.
121 Monthly Jail Reports, GA. DEP’T COMMUNITY AFF., https://www.dca.ga.gov/localgovernment-assistance/research-surveys/monthly-jail-reports (last visited Apr. 17, 2020).
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defendants in jail for every thousand county residents, on average,
on any given day of the year. The number ranged from zero to near
seven. Figure 2 illustrates the range, with darker fill corresponding
to a higher pretrial detention rate and the rates rounded to the
nearest integer. We note that the counties with the highest pretrial
detention rates include higher-density counties, like Chatham
County, as well as lower-density counties like Ware County.
Appendix D provides more detail.
Figure 2: Average Per Capita Pretrial Detention Rate by County,
2019.

C. LIMITATIONS

Our qualitative study has many limitations. Most significantly,
we were only able to observe bail hearings in thirteen of the fifty-five
counties we identified for study. It generally proved easier to
court-watch in more populous counties; only three of the thirteen
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counties in which court-watching was achieved were in the
less-dense half of the total sample. Further, due to the size of our
study sample, scheduling, and the geographic spread of counties
studied, in most instances the information gleaned by the research
volunteers was limited to the information available on the given day
or days of contact. For example, students who conducted interviews
over the phone—despite best efforts to reach someone with
firsthand knowledge—were limited by who happened to take their
call and by that person’s degree of familiarity with misdemeanor
pretrial practice. In other jurisdictions, students were
accommodated to observe court—including in places where court
proceedings are not otherwise open to the public—but their
presence as observers may have had an interactive effect with the
manner in which the hearing was run. Finally, and significantly,
while the authors made every effort to train volunteers, follow up
with questions, and use consistent materials to track information,
this study was limited by the ability of a decentralized group of
volunteers to frame our questions about misdemeanor post-arrest
practice to local officials from across the state, who may use a
variety of terms for the procedures we sought to understand, or not
have any procedures at all.
Notwithstanding the use of multiple research methods, however,
we believe the results convey important and reliable information,
especially in the aggregate. We found that the overall results for
each metric studied did not vary widely depending on the research
method deployed.122 Nor did we encounter inconsistent information
from court-watching versus phone interviews in any county.
The jail-data analysis is also subject to serious limitations. To
start, the jail-inmate registries we tracked were non-random,
although they did represent a geographically diverse subset of
Georgia counties. Counties were selected for convenience in order to
maximize our data within the study’s time constraints. As a
consequence, a disproportionate number of the counties whose jail
registries we tracked were rural. We cannot vouch for the accuracy
of the data published on the jail registry sites.123 The effort to
122 For instance, regardless of the methodology employed in a county, the trend held that
0–15% of counties studied “guaranteed release” within forty-eight hours. See infra Part VIII.
123 Mistakes in data input for several of the jail websites was identified in various records.
These mistakes resulted in observations that were not always accurate. Day-by-day analyses
of the data detected edits made by jail staff to correct some mistakes, providing support that
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restrict the data to records of those arrested on new misdemeanor
charges alone, and not subject to other holds, may also have
introduced unintended distortions into the data, although we tried
to accomplish this process as carefully as possible. Our analysis of
the jail data published by the Department of Community Affairs,
finally, is subject to limitations discussed further in Appendix D.
We readily acknowledge these limitations and offer our results
as a provisional picture of misdemeanor bail practice in Georgia
rather than a conclusive audit. Both the authors and the Georgia
Law Review welcome additional information or notice of error.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. UNIVERSALIZE ADHERENCE TO THE LAW

The chief finding from this research is that most counties will
need to adapt their misdemeanor post-arrest practices to comply
with state and federal law. This will require commitment from both
state and local actors.
1. Recommendations for Local Officials.
County and municipal officials charged with administering
misdemeanor post-arrest process could make a handful of
improvements to actualize the legal principles from Walker124 and
the amended Georgia Code.
First, court officials should consider adopting financial affidavits
like the one in use in Glynn County,125 or undertake the same
detailed financial inquiry during first appearances in court. The
ultimate question should be what amount an individual can
immediately afford to pay,126 considering not only her income but
also fixed expenses and other debts. Implementation of more
these records were at least being regularly verified, while other mistakes were interpretable,
such as misspellings of prisoners’ offenses.
124 Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018) (dealing with post-arrest
procedures and the impact of bail requirements on low-income individuals).
125 See infra Part XI.
126 The authors do not recommend that courts should factor in the possible use of a
commercial bondsman; instead they should consider the total bond amount as though the
individual was posting it. This is because, due to the wide discretion they are afforded, there
is no guarantee that a bondsman will post bail in any given case and because the individual
may not be in a position to surrender a non-refundable deposit to a commercial bail agent but
would post an affordable bail amount and return to court to get it back.
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standardized forms and procedures would reduce judicial discretion
in making ability-to-pay determinations, which can lead to
inaccuracies and inconsistency.127
Second, jailers and sheriff’s department employees should keep
a close eye on the population in their jails who are detained because
of a bail requirement and set a hearing before a judge for anyone
approaching the forty-eight-hour mark. “Jail call” hearings
provided in Clarke County—through which those who remain
incarcerated are brought before a judge to configure release
conditions—provide a good example of a possible safeguard, though
counties should hold such hearings frequently enough to ensure
that wealth-based incarceration does not exceed the presumptively
constitutional forty-eight-hour mark.
Third, local law enforcement agencies may reduce the overall
burden on their systems while promoting compliance with state and
federal law by adopting the legislative recommendation to issue
citations and summonses rather than booking individuals suspected
of misdemeanors into jail.128
Finally, court officials and jailers could adopt a policy, like that
employed with respect to traffic tickets in Gilmer and Gwinnett
counties, that anyone incarcerated for forty-eight hours on a
misdemeanor bond they cannot pay is automatically released on a
recognizance or unsecured bond. As noted by the Eleventh Circuit’s
predecessor court, “[s]ystems which incorporate a presumption
favoring personal recognizance avoid much of the difficulty inherent
in the entire subject area.”129 Such a policy spares the local
administrative burden of holding hearings frequently enough to
ensure the forty-eight-hour mark is not exceeded. Further, recent
empirical evidence suggests that unsecured bonds130 or release with

127 See Meghan M. O’Neil & J.J. Prescott, Targeting Poverty in the Courts: Improving the
Measurement of Ability to Pay, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 205–06 (2019) (describing
how ability-to-pay determinations are often ad hoc and often vary among judges, who may
not have the training or expertise to conduct such evaluations).
128 S.B. 407, 154th General Assemb., 2d Sess. (Ga. 2018); see also O.C.G.A. § 17-4-23(a)(2)
(2018) (establishing procedure for handling misdemeanor traffic violations).
129 Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978).
130 See, e.g., BRICE COOK ET AL., USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
OUTCOMES
(Jan.
2018),
https://www.courthousenews.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/crim-just-report.pdf; MICHAEL R. JONES, UNSECURED BONDS: THE
AS EFFECTIVE AND MOST EFFICIENT PRETRIAL RELEASE OPTION (Oct. 2013),
https://cutt.ly/Se3WGqK (controlling for risk level and finding that persons released on
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court date reminders131 adequately promote court appearance and
public safety.132
2. Recommendations for State Officials.
Misdemeanor bail reform was recently a statewide priority with
a number of high-profile champions in Georgia.133 The results of this
study suggest that further attention to implementation on the part
of influential state actors would be beneficial. State officials should
consider a combination of oversight, funding, and public education
in order to realize the legislative change enacted and to reduce local
jurisdictions’ vulnerability to additional legal challenges.
Members of the statewide Judicial Qualifications Commission
may wish to consider undertaking their own court observations to
determine whether local judges are following Rules 1.1 (Complying
With the Law), 1.2 (Promoting Public Confidence in the Judiciary),
and 2.6 (Ensuring the Right to Be Heard) of the Georgia Code of
Judicial Conduct.134 Members of the State Supreme Court could
exercise a leadership role by stressing a culture of pretrial release
with their judicial colleagues, including supporting judges against
political backlash after they make decisions that promote release.135
Such institutional leadership was critical to a cultural change in

unsecured bonds performed as well as those released on secured bonds in terms of court
appearance rates).
131 See NAT’L INST. CORR., A FRAMEWORK FOR PRETRIAL JUSTICE 47 (Feb. 2017),
https://cutt.ly/ke6QJzk (noting court date reminders are “highly effective” and citing reports
from eight jurisdictions about adopting the practice).
132 JONES, supra note 130, at 3 (identifying court appearance and public safety as important
objectives for pretrial release policies).
133 See Cook, supra note 6 (describing bail reform efforts by Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance
Bottoms); Maya T. Prabhu, Georgia Governor Signs Bail Overhaul into Law, ATLANTA J.
CONST. (May 7, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/georgiagovernor-signs-bail-overhaul-into-law/QxiIFhCmAyLHz2NoSyO3dI/ (describing Georgia
Governor Nathan Deal’s bail reform efforts).
134 GEORGIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2016).
135 For an insightful reflection, see Ronald Kessler, I Set a Defendant Free and Got Blamed
When He Raped Someone, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 31, 2017, 10:00 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/08/31/i-set-a-defendant-free-and-got-blamedwhen-he-raped-someone.
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New Jersey,136 where courts have been faithfully following new
pretrial procedures.137
Further, executive and legislative officials should prioritize
funding for the supports needed to ensure that local practices
comply with legal requirements. This is of particular importance in
areas like public defense, where counties bear a significant share of
the financial burden, and many rural counties simply do not have
the resources to meet their legal burdens. This includes allocating
funding for pretrial services, especially court reminders, to facilitate
successful pretrial release. Adequately funded public defense
counsel is critical to the success of any reforms, as public defenders
are the first resource for arrested persons otherwise harmed by
wealth-based detention.
Additionally, state legislators and the Attorney General likely
need to eliminate barriers to the local use of citation and/or
summons practices. For example, O.C.G.A. § 17-4-23(a)(2) requires
fingerprinting pursuant to arrest at the specification of the Attorney
General. Other local law enforcement agencies may be required to
conduct a more expansive collection of identifying information in
order to receive state or federal grants.138 If local law enforcement
officials believe they are required to arrest and book all individuals
charged with misdemeanors in order to comply with other data
collection requirements, it will seriously impede their ability to
undertake citations practices that would enable many individuals
to avoid jail altogether.139
Finally, those who contributed to the successful passage of SB
407 may consider renewed attention to the issue in light of its
limited implementation. Continued public education and
conversation through Georgia’s judicial councils,140 other
136 See New Jersey Reform Leader Says Better Data Strengthened Bail System, PEW
CHARITABLE TR. (May 1, 2019), https://cutt.ly/2rHNWwF (discussing, inter alia, the
importance of judicial culture change to ensuring the success of reforms).
137 See generally N.J. CTS., 2018 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE (2019),
https://cutt.ly/LrHNIz4 (detailing the fact that New Jersey’s criminal justice reforms,
particularly a new approach to pretrial release, are working as intended).
138 See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Grant Will Provide Law
Enforcement Assistance in Savannah (Sept. 10, 2019), https://cutt.ly/8rHXwCs
(contemplating grant to provide local law enforcement with, inter alia, fingerprint scanners).
139 The state task force identified that this issue “likely eliminates any incentives for law
enforcement to utilize citations.” See AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 40, at 28.
140 Examples include the Council of Magistrate Judges, the Council of Municipal Court
Judges, and the Council of State Court Judges.
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professional councils,141 and amongst elected officials would be
helpful. Journalism documenting local practices and the harms
caused by more than two days of wealth-based detention could
contribute to public education and continued progress. Similarly,
civil rights advocates, activists, and others interested in this issue
may wish to renew their focus on pretrial justice in Georgia—
including in counties beyond the metropolitan Atlanta area—in
light of these initial findings.
B. FURTHER REFORMS TO CONSIDER

The focus of this study was on compliance with existing law.
There will remain, however, considerable room for improvement in
Georgia after practices adhere more closely to the legislative and
judicial guidance of the past few years. First, a number of
recommendations of the state task force—including explicitly
providing local courts with the authority to designate bail schedule
amounts as unsecured, or permitting automatic release on
non-monetary bail for individuals whose charges do not authorize a
sentence of jail—were not adopted into law.142 Also, notably, few of
the protections outlined in this paper explicitly reach those accused
of felonies.143 A considerable number of individuals in Georgia are
arrested and detained while presumed innocent on felony charges.
These individuals are protected by the same federal constitutional
principles outlined in Walker II and other federal court decisions
across the country, and serious discussion about the overbroad use
of pretrial detention in felony cases is due in Georgia.

141 Examples include the Council of Magistrate Court Clerks, the Association County
Commissioners of Georgia, and the Constitutional Officers Association of Georgia.
142 AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 40, at 30–31.
143 The plain text of O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(e)(2) does not limit the financial inquiry or “as soon
as possible” bail determination language to misdemeanors. Only persons charged with
misdemeanors, however, have an affirmative statutory right to bail. O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(b)(1)
(2018).
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Given the criminogenic effect of incarceration in a jail,144 state
and local lawmakers may wish to create categories of charges145 for
which citation or immediate post-booking release is mandatory, not
simply discretionary. Such a practice would promote system
efficiency and uniformity while avoiding constitutional infirmity.
Further, local lawmakers should examine the anchoring effect of
preset bail schedules in normalizing or extending wealth-based
pretrial detention and consider either eliminating schedules or
modifying them to prescribe unsecured rather than upfront
requirements of bail, unless a law enforcement officer or
prosecuting attorney files for an individualized consideration of
more restrictive conditions than an unsecured bond.146
This study was undertaken before the novel coronavirus, leading
to an easily-transmittable and serious disease known as COVID-19,
swept the nation and globe.147 Public health experts agree148 that
144 Social scientists link poverty, lack of economic opportunity, shame and isolation, and
exposure to violence to violent conduct. See, e.g., JAMES GILLIGAN, VIOLENCE: OUR DEADLY
EPIDEMIC AND ITS CAUSES 103–04, 191 (1996); Patterns of Violence in American Society, in 1
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 70 (Albert Reiss & Jeffrey Roth eds., 1993);
Cleopatra H. Caldwell et al., Racial Discrimination and Racial Identity as Risk or Protective
Factors for Violent Behaviors in African American Young Adults, 33 AM. J. COMMUNITY
PSYCHOL. 91 (2004); Bruce P. Kennedy et al., Social Capital, Income Inequality, and Firearm
Violent Crime, 47 SOC. SCI. & MED. 7 (1998); Li-yu Song et al., Violence Exposure and
Emotional Trauma as Contributors to Adolescents’ Violent Behaviors, 152 ARCHIVES
PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 531 (1998). Jails expose individuals to, or at least contribute
to, virtually all of these conditions. See generally DANIELLE SERED, VERA INST. FOR JUSTICE,
ACCOUNTING FOR VIOLENCE: HOW TO INCREASE SAFETY AND BREAK OUR FAILED RELIANCE ON
MASS INCARCERATION (2017), https://cutt.ly/ErHCYNc.
145 State law would only prohibit inclusion of the serious charges listed in O.C.G.A.
§ 17-6-1(a) on this list: other less serious felonies and all non-family violence misdemeanors
could receive this treatment.
146 A federal district court in the Eleventh Circuit structured an injunction to operate in
this manner. Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, Schultz v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (No. 5:17-cv-00270-MHH),
2018 WL 9908709.
147 Robert Verity et al., Estimates of the Severity of Coronavirus Disease 2019: A
Model-Based Analysis, LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Mar. 30, 2020, at 6; Derek Hawkins et
al., Trump Declares Coronavirus Outbreak a National Emergency, WASH. POST (Mar. 13,
2020, 10:46 PM), https://cutt.ly/ftWyIPb.
148 See, e.g., Declaration of Dr. Jaimie Meyer at ¶¶ 37–38, ECF No. 42, Velesaca v. Decker,
1:20-cv-01803-AKH (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2020) (noting that population reduction in jails will
be “crucially important to reducing the level of risk both for those within [jail] facilities and
for the community at large,” and that stemming the flow of intakes is a part of the necessary
intervention); Declaration of Robert B. Greifinger, MD at ¶ 13, ECF No. 4, Dawson v. Asher,
2:20-cv-00409-JLR-MAT (W.D. Wash. Mar. 16, 2020) (“In my opinion, the public health
recommendation is to release high-risk people from detention, given the heightened risks to
their health and safety, especially given the lack of a viable vaccine for prevention or effective
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widespread release of persons in jails—particularly those in pretrial
custody—is a necessary intervention to slow the spread of this
serious disease, both in custody and in the greater community: jail
environments resemble other congregate environments like cruise
ships149 and nursing homes.150 This provides a separate, and
ever-more urgent, basis for Georgia counties to evaluate pretrial
release practices to ensure the greater public health. Lessons may
be learned from these exigent circumstances that help facilitate
even narrower uses of pretrial detention in the future.
Lastly, it bears recognizing that Georgia leads the nation in its
rate of placing people on probation, at 5,143 people on probation per
100,000 people.151 The second highest rate of probation is in
Pennsylvania at 2,968 per 100,000 people. Nearly half a million
people are on probation in Georgia.152 An underexplored area of
reform, then, is the incarceration of individuals for technical
violations of probation, or who are arrested on a low-level charge
and otherwise eligible for pretrial release but for a probation hold.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although Georgia has made hard-earned progress in
misdemeanor bail reform, this study suggests that the work of
advancing justice in Georgia’s pretrial system is far from over. After
the initial fanfare of a bill enactment and judicial ruling, it is
natural for energy and attention to shift to the next project. But the

treatment at this stage.”); Declaration of Dr. Marc Stern at ¶¶ 9–10, ECF No. 6, Dawson,
2:20-cv-00409-JLR-MAT (noting that release is “a critically important way to meaningfully
mitigate” the risks of harm to persons who are at high risk of serious illness or death, as well
as to support the broader community health infrastructure).
149 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is currently recommending that
travelers defer cruise ship travel worldwide. COVID-19 and Cruise Ship Travel, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://cutt.ly/7tEEQvT (last updated Mar. 17, 2020)
(“Cruise ship passengers are at increased risk of person-to-person spread of infectious
diseases, including COVID-19.”).
150 The CDC notes that long-term care facilities and nursing homes pose a particular risk
because of “their congregate nature” and the residents served. See Nursing Homes &
Long-Term Care Facilities, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://cutt.ly/7tEEITH (last updated Apr. 15, 2020).
151 Alexi Jones, Correctional Control 2018: Incarceration and Supervision by State, PRISON
POL’Y INST. (Dec. 2019), https://cutt.ly/ErHNZyy (“Georgia is punitive from any angle, as the
only state that is both a top jailer and leader in probation.”).
152 Carrie Teegardin, Georgia Leads Nation in Probation, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Nov. 19,
2015), https://cutt.ly/2rHN4Jw.

1270

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1235

needless and harmful jailing of Georgians due to their inability to
pay bail persists across the state.
In light of these findings, local officials may wish to make
improvements such as: (1) expanding the use of citations and other
mandatory release procedures, (2) expediting post-arrest hearings
and release, (3) increasing the quality and accuracy of ability-to-pay
hearings, and (4) implementing safeguards such as jail-review
hearings or other automatic methods by which those who remain in
jail due to inability to pay are identified and released within
forty-eight hours of arrest. We encourage state officials to:
(1) increase oversight of local court practices, (2) provide political
leadership and continued education on recent reforms, (3) increase
resources for public defense and pretrial supports, and (4) remove
barriers to the use of citations and other automatic post-charging
release practices, particularly mandatory fingerprinting.
Ultimately, however, a wide range of stakeholders—law
enforcement, judges, lawmakers, other elected officials, activists,
and attorneys—must make a concerted effort in order to create a
culture in which “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or
without trial . . . the carefully limited exception.”153 Georgia would
be well served by ensuring that progress toward this goal is not
undermined by a lack of implementation on the ground and by
taking the additional steps needed to actualize this tenet of our
democracy.

153

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
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VII. APPENDIX A: COUNTIES RANDOMLY SELECTED FOR STUDY154
First District
Atlantic, Brunswick, Eastern, Ogeechee, and Waycross Circuits—
median population density: 50.5
Lower than median density counties
County
Population
Density
Charlton
12,171
15.7
Jenkins
8,340
24.0
Wayne
30,099
46.9
Higher than median density counties
Liberty
63,453
129.5
Glynn
79,625
189.7
Chatham
265,128
621.7
Second District
Alapaha, Dougherty, Pataula, Southern, South Georgia, and
Tifton Circuits—median population density: 32.9
Lower than median density counties
County
Population
Density
Clay
3,183
16.3
Randolph
7,719
18.0
Terrell
9,315
27.8
Higher than median density counties
Worth
21,679
38.0
Thomas
44,720
82.1
Tift
40,118
154.9
Third District
Chattahoochee, Houston, Macon, and Southwestern Circuits—
median population density: 42.1
Lower than median density counties
County
Population
Density
Webster
2,799
13.4
Talbot
6,865
17.5
154 Each county’s total population and population density number is from the 2010 Census.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEORGIA: 2010 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING 9–11 (Aug.
2010),
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2010/cph-2/cph-2-12.pdf.
“Density” refers to inhabitants per square mile.
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Taylor
8,906
23.6
Higher than median density counties
Harris
32,024
69.0
Bibb
155,547
622.8
Muscogee
189,885
877.5
Fourth District
Stone Mountain and Rockdale Circuits
Counties (total, both selected)
County
Population
Density
DeKalb
691,893
2,585.7
Rockdale
85,215
656.5
Fifth District
Atlanta Circuit
County
Fulton

Counties (one selected)
Population
920,581

Density
1,748.0

Sixth District
Clayton, Coweta, Flint, Griffin, and Towaliga Circuits—median
population density: 145.1
Lower than median density counties
County
Population
Density
Heard
11,834
40.0
Meriwether
21,992
43.9
Lamar
18,317
99.8
Higher than median density counties
Coweta
21,679
38.0
Fayette
106,567
548.3155
Clayton
259,424
1,832.5
Seventh District
Cherokee, Cobb, Conasauga, Douglas, Lookout Mountain,
Paulding, Rome, and Tallapoosa Circuits—median population
density: 172
Lower than median density counties
155

Fayette County was randomly replaced by Carroll County on November 7, 2019.
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County
Population
Density
Dade
16,633
95.6
Haralson
28,780
102.0
Polk
41,475
133.6
Higher than median density counties
Paulding
142,324
455.8
Douglas
132,403
661.8
Cobb
688,078
2,026.4
Eighth District
Cordele, Dublin, Middle, Ocmulgee, and Oconee Circuits—
median population density: 38.1
Lower than median density counties
County
Population
Density
Wilcox
9,255
24.5
Treutlen
6,885
34.5
Montgomery
9,123
38.1156
Higher than median density counties
Pulaski
12,010
48.2
Putnam
21,218
61.6
Ben Hill
17,634
70.5
Ninth District
Appalachian, Blue Ridge, Bell-Forsyth, Enotah, Gwinnett,
Mountain, and Northeastern Circuits—median population
density: 112.8
Lower than median density counties
County
Population
Density
Rabun
16,276
44.0
Fannin
23,682
61.2
Gilmer
28,292
66.3
Higher than median density counties
Pickens
29,431
126.8
Habersham
43,041
155.5
Gwinnett
805,321
1,871.2
156 The Eighth Circuit had two counties with a population density of 38.1 people per square
mile: (1) Montgomery County and (2) Dooly County. Dooly County was the “median” by
density when the counties were listed in order by population density, so Montgomery County
was not disqualified from the randomizer.
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Tenth District
Alcovy, Augusta, Northern, Piedmont, Toombs, and Western
Circuits—median population density: 85.0
Lower than median density counties
County
Population
Density
Taliaferro
1,717
8.8
Elbert
20,166
57.4
Banks
18,395
79.3
Higher than median density counties
Oconee
32,808
178.0
Richmond
200,549
618.4
Clarke
116,714
979.1
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VIII. APPENDIX B: RESEARCH FINDINGS
Initial
Bail
Hearing
Within
48
Hours?

Table 1: Findings from Court Observations
Counsel at
ATP
If ATP, How?
Initial Bail
Considered
Hearing?
at Bail
Hearing

No
No

No
Yes

No
Yes

Yes
Yes

No
No

Yes
Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes
No
No
Yes

No
Yes
No
No

No
No
Yes
Yes

No
No

No
No

No
Sometimes

Judge asks about
income and ability to
pay amt. in bond
Unknown
Financial affidavit
(does not include
liabilities); Judge
inquires if able to
afford a bond (not
specific amounts);
Judge asks about
income, assets, debt,
and dependents
Unclear: no financial
affidavit discussed, but
finances seemed to be
considered per court
watchers
Financial affidavit
(available in
appendix), Judge did
not inquire at hearing

Financial affidavit
Informal; Judge and
sheriff are familiar
with inidivdual’s
circumstances because
it is a small
community
Judge asks accused
about income
(sometimes), assets

Release
Guarant
eed
Within
48 Hours
if Unable
to Pay
Initial
Bail?
No
No
No
No

No

Yes

Yes
No
No
No

No
No
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38.46%
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(sometimes),
dependents
(sometimes), and what
amount the person
could pay (sometimes)
No
Yes
Judge asked accused
about income and
dependents
Total Yes and % Yes (rounded to nearest hundredth)
3
8
23.08%
61.54%

Initial Bail
Hearing
Always
Within 48
Hours?
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
2
20%

Initial
Bail
Hearing
Within
48
Hours?
Yes
Yes
No
No

[Vol. 54:1235

No

2
15.38%

Table 2: Findings from Calls with Clerks
Counsel at
ATP
If ATP, How?
Initial Bail
Considered at
Hearing?
Bail Hearing?

Release
Guarantee
d Within
48 Hours if
Unable to
Pay Initial
Bail?
Unknown
Unknown
No
Unknown
Unknown
No
Unknown
Unknown
No
Unknown
Unknown
No
Unknown
Unknown
No
Unknown
Unknown
No
No
Unknown
No
Unknown
Sometimes
Unknown
No
No
No
No
Total Yes and % Yes (rounded to nearest hundreth)
0
1
0
0%
10%
0%
Table 3: Findings from Public Defender Interviews
Counsel at
ATP Considered
If ATP, How?
Release
Initial Bail
at Bail Hearing
Guaranteed
Hearing?
Within 48
Hours if
Unable to
Pay Initial
Bail?
No
No
No
No
Yes
Unknown
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Informal;
No
Judge and
sheriff are
familiar with
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2
40%

Initial
Bail
Hearing
Within
48
Hours?
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
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inidivdual's
circumstances
because it is a
small
community
No
No
Eventually,
bond reduction
hearing or
sheriff recog
release if
someone in
because can't
pay
Total Yes and % Yes (rounded to nearest hundredth)
1
2
20%
40%
Table 4: Findings from Judge Interviews157
Counsel at
ATP Considered
If ATP, How?
Initial Bail
at Bail Hearing
Hearing?

No
No
No
No

No
No
No
No

Yes
No
No

Yes
No
Yes

No

Yes

Judge asks
about income
and ability to
pay amount in
bond
Unknown
Financial
affidavit (does
not include
liabilities),
Judge inquires
if able to afford
a bond (not
specific
amounts),
Judge asks

The last five interviews were conducted with magistrate judges.

No

0
0%

Release
Guaranteed
Within 48
Hours if
Unable to
Pay Initial
Bail?
No
No
No
No
No

No
No
No
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No

Yes
No
No
Yes
Unclear

No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

13
62%

Yes
No
No

Yes
No
No

No
No

Yes
Unknown

No
Unknown
No
No
No
Yes

Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

about income,
assets, debt,
and
dependents
Unclear: no
financial
affidavit
discussed, but
finances
seemed to be
considered per
court watchers

Financial
affidavit
Judge asks
questions, no
affidavit.
Unclear how
detailed.
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No

Yes
No
No
Yes
No

No
No
No
No
No
Yes

Questions
Judge asks
No
Yes
questions.
Judge asks
Yes
No
Yes
questions.
Total Yes and % Yes (rounded to nearest hundreth)
3
10
4
14.29%
47.62%
19.05%

Table 5: Findings from Jail and Sheriff Interviews158
Initial
Counsel at
ATP Considered
If ATP, How?
Release
Bail
Initial Bail
at Bail Hearing
Guaranteed
Hearing
Hearing?
Within 48
Within
Hours if
48
Unable to
Hours?
Pay Initial
Bail?
No
No
No
No

158 The first three interviews were conducted with jail staff, and the remaining interviews
were conducted with sheriffs.
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No
No
No
Yes
No

Yes
No
No
Yes
Unknown
3
27.27%

Initial
Bail
Hearing
Within
48
Hours?
Yes
Yes
No
No
Unknown

No
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Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No

Yes
Unknown
Yes
No
Unknown
No

Informal;
Judge and
sheriff are
familiar with
individual’s
circumstances
because it is a
small
community
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No
No
No
No
No
No

Informal;
Judge and
sheriff are
familiar with
individual’s
circumstances
because it is a
small
community

No
Yes
No
No
Unknown
No
No
No
No
No
Unknown
Unknown
No
No
No
Total Yes and % Yes (rounded to nearest hundredth)
2
3
0
18.18%
42.86%
0%
Table 6: Findings from Clerk Interviews
Counsel
ATP Considered
If ATP, how?
at Initial
at Bail Hearing
Bail
Hearing?

No
No
No
No
No

No

Yes
No
No
Unknown
Unknown

Yes

Informally

Judge asks
questions,
unclear how
detailed

Release
Guaranteed
Within 48
Hours if
Unable to
Pay Initial
Bail?
Yes
No
No
No
No

No
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Judge asks
about
dependents,
judge asks
accused about
income, judge
asks about
Unknown
No
Yes
disability
No
Total Yes and % Yes (rounded to nearest hundredth)
2
0
3
1
40%
0%
60%
14.29%
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IX. APPENDIX C: JAIL DATA METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
County-level jail records were obtained from online Georgia
county jail inmate registries. These registries are publicly available,
updated daily, and published by the jails. Inmate registries contain
information about persons held in jails, including their
demographics, current charges, date of booking, and bond. Not
every county reported identical variables, but they each reported on
these categories of variables to some extent. The published records
contained these seventeen variables:
(1) Jail Id: Identifier for each inmate
(2) SO Number: Secondary identifier for each inmate
(3) Full Name
(4) Address
(5) Age and year of birth
(6) Gender
(7) Race
(8) When Booked: Date and time of booking
(9) When Released: Date and time of release
(10) Hours Jailed: Number of hours between booking and release
(11) Charge Count: Total number of charges
(12) Charge Descriptions: List of charges
(13) Felony: Presence of a felony charge
(14) Misdemeanor: Presence of a misdemeanor charge
(15) Charge Dispositions: Status of charges
(16) Bond Types: Conditions for release
(17) Bond Amount: Payment required for release, if set by judge
Approximately sixty-two of the 159 counties in Georgia publish
this information online. For this study, twenty of the sixty-two
counties were analyzed. The twenty counties studied were not
strategically selected, but instead chosen for their accessibility.
Records for eighteen of these counties were collected daily from May
through November 2019, yielding booking records for 15,369
individuals. The twentieth county, DeKalb, provides about
twenty-two years of records from late 1997 to present (February
2020). Records from DeKalb County contained booking records for
475,959 individuals. The records appear to be incomplete for years
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before 2000 and complete in years afterward, with the exception of
2001.
The availability of records per-county was assessed manually
with the help of a group of volunteer high school students who were
members of the North Oconee High School Beta Club, directed by
Dr. Paige Cole and Richard Rosch. These students were taught to
differentiate between genuine and fake inmate registries, the latter
of which were common. Each student was then given a list of
Georgia counties and instructed to search for authentic county jail
inmate registries, with each county jail website being checked twice
by students and again by the project directors.
The authentic jail inmate registries employed a variety of
record management systems. Most used one of eight different
systems. For each record management system, one web scraping
program can be written to collect data from all counties that use it.
Such scrapers were developed and deployed in May 2019. The
scrapers were automated to scrape each county daily, to track the
entrance and exit of prisoners, and to track changes in each
prisoner’s status.
The resulting data sets were cleaned and filtered for purposes
of this study. Input errors made by the booking agent at the county
jails were discovered in the data. Records with obvious entry errors
were deleted from the data set. These were most often caused by
incorrect booking or release dates. The data was further filtered to
restrict the records to defendants charged only with misdemeanors.
Individuals charged with felonies were removed from the dataset.
Those with charge dispositions indicating that they were being held
for a parole or probation violation, to serve a jail sentence, or in lieu
of detention in a state or federal facility were also dropped.159 The
final data sets contained records for a total 1,506 prisoners in
eighteen of the counties. In DeKalb County, 153,579 of the records
from a twenty-year range were kept.

159 Entries were dropped wherever charges included any variation of the following terms:
“probation,” “parole,” “housed for,” “court violation,” “bond violation,” “failure to appear,”
“marshall,” “back for,” “remain in jail,” “weekender,” “extradition,” “for court,” “fugitive,”
“UCEA”, “foreign warrant,” “incompetent,” “USMS,” “return from,” “work release,” “court
order”, “hold for”, “order to transport,” “bond revocation,” “violated bond,” “awaiting
sentence,” “health evaluation,” “MHE,” “violation of family violence order,” “co hold,” “per
judge,” “sentenced,” “bench warrant.”
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Table 1: Date Ranges for Records Per County
County

Start date

End date

Bookings

Atkinson

2019-05-24

2019-10-30

276

Ben Hill

2019-05-24

2019-11-14

212

Brooks

2019-09-17

2019-11-14

336

Catoosa

2019-05-24

2019-11-16

568

Chattooga

2019-05-24

2019-11-14

647

Decatur

2019-05-24

2019-11-14

788

Gilmer

2019-05-24

2019-11-24

1,539

Gordon

2019-05-24

2019-11-14

733

Haralson

2019-05-24

2019-11-14

1,530

Jeff Davis

2019-05-24

2019-11-14

2,737

Newton

2019-05-24

2019-11-14

83

Pickens

2019-05-24

2019-11-14

428

Pierce

2019-05-24

2019-11-14

1,242

Tift

2019-05-24

2019-11-14

327

Towns

2019-05-24

2019-11-14

517

Turner

2019-05-25

2019-11-14

1,758

Ware

2019-09-19

2019-11-29

167

Worth

2019-09-17

2019-11-14

276
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Table 2: DeKalb County Booking Records Per Year
Year

Bookings

2000

23,469

2001

11,379160

2002

22,233

2003

24,048

2004

25,699

2005

26,313

2006

27,477

2007

26,015

2008

25,058

2009

24,789

2010

24,958

2011

23,985

2012

25,300

2013

24,124

2014

23,918

2015

22,175

160 We do not know why the number of bookings documented in 2001 is approximately half
that in every other year, but we suspect the anomaly is due to political turmoil surrounding
the DeKalb County Sheriff position at that time. Former Sheriff Dorsey and his deputies
murdered Sheriff-elect Brown on December 15, 2000. We surmise that record-keeping at the
jail may have been neglected in the chaos that followed. See Joshua Sharpe, DeKalb Sheriffs:
Getting in Trouble with the Law Since 1951, ATLANTA J. CONST. (June 1, 2017),
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ajc.com/news/local/jcBkjSPxU1TuCPOrH4VevL/__;!
!Phyt6w!NHDXj3knXPWPlV1_NpIHen2wrSAuFcqS_s_hP4hoN-9MDgj3BLhkyNmAsKoo$.
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2016

20,155

2017

23,413

2018

26,647

2019

21,416

1285

Findings from our research are as follows:
In eighteen counties, 1,010 of the 2,750 people arrested on new
misdemeanor charges between May and November 2019 spent three
days or more in jail (36.72%).
Statistics from 18 counties (in days):
• Minimum: 1 day
• First quartile: 1 day
• Median: 2 days
• Third quartile: 5 days
• Maximum: 497 days
• Mean: 8.7 days
• Standard deviation: 27.7 days
Table 3: Misdemeanor Arrests ≥ 3 Days in Jail
County

Percentage

Atkinson

80%

Ware

54%

Ben Hill

52%

Decatur

46%

Haralson

46%

Catoosa

44%

Brooks

42%
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Gordon

40%

Gilmer

39%

Newton

34%

Pierce

29%

Tift

28%

Turner

22%

Towns

20%

Worth

18%

Jeff Davis

17%

Chattooga

11%

Pickens

N/A (no misdemeanor booking)

Overall

37%

In DeKalb County, 112,340 of the 212,091 people arrested on new
misdemeanor charges from 2000 through 2019 spent three days or
more in jail (52.96%).
Statistics from DeKalb County (in hours):
• Minimum: 1 hour
• First quartile: 27 hours
• Median: 76 hours
• Third quartile: 287 hours
• Maximum: 78,762 hours
• Mean: 269.5 hours
• Standard deviation: 730.9 hours
For people who eventually bonded out with cash or
surety:
• Median: 36 hours (1.5 days)
• Mean: 103 hours (4.2 days), standard deviation 370 hours
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For people who eventually signed own recognizance:
• Median: 81 hours (3.3 days)
• Mean: 229 hours (9.5 days), standard deviation 459 hours
Table 4: DeKalb County Misdemeanor
Arrests ≥ 3 Days in Jail
Year

Percentage above 3 days

2000

55.34% (4,999/9,033)

2001

57.59% (2,616/4,542)

2002

66.25% (6,075/9,169)

2003

66.44% (6,772/10,192)

2004

57.59% (6,291/10,922)

2005

64.64% (6,933/10,725)

2006

66.50% (7,758/11,666)

2007

63.43% (6,891/10,863)

2008

65.55% (6,464/9,860)

2009

63.11% (6,404/10,147)

2010

57.63% (6,257/10,857)

2011

55.95% (6,379/11,401)

2012

53.56% (6,097/11,382)

2013

51.41% (5,431/10,563)

2014

39.54% (3,372/8,528)

2015

39.75% (3,766/9,473)

2016

39.54% (3,372/8,528)
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2017

33.29% (5,137/15,431)

2018

33.29% (5,137/15,431)

2019

26.50% (3,421/12,909)
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X. APPENDIX D: DATA FROM MONTHLY JAIL REPORTS
The Georgia Department of Community Affairs publishes
monthly jail reports in collaboration with the Georgia Sheriffs’
Association, Georgia Crime Information Center, and Georgia
Bureau of Investigation.161 Each report documents the number of
inmates awaiting trial in each county’s jail on a specified date each
month. The data also includes each county’s population on the
reporting date. For each county, we calculated the “per capita
pretrial detention rate” on each reporting date during 2019 by
dividing the number of pretrial detainees by the county’s total
population. Then, for each county, we calculated the average of the
per capita detention rates as reported in the twelve months of 2019.
Table 1: Average Daily Pretrial Detention Rate
(average daily pretrial detainees per thousand residents,
2019)
Ware
6.7
Pulaski 2.9
Jackson 1.9
Spalding
6.0
Walker 2.9
Macon 1.9
Chatham
5.8
Treutlen 2.9
Telfair 1.9
Coffee
5.3 Oglethorpe 2.9
Fannin 1.9
Troup
5.0
Effingham 2.9
Hancock 1.9
Randolph
5.0
Toombs 2.9
Newton 1.8
Crisp
4.9
Peach 2.9
Franklin 1.8
Dougherty
4.8
Wilkinson 2.8
Hall 1.8
Muscogee
4.5
Bleckley 2.8
Screven 1.8
Dodge
4.4
Heard 2.8
Candler 1.8
Butts
4.4
Brooks 2.7
Lincoln 1.7
Sumter
4.4
Terrell 2.7
Hart 1.7
Stephens
4.3
Emanuel 2.7
Dekalb 1.7
Dooly
4.2
Grady 2.7
Jenkins 1.7
Lowndes
4.1
Dade 2.6
Worth 1.7
Ben hill
4.1
Catoosa 2.6
Cherokee 1.6
Colquitt
3.9
Mitchell 2.6
Gwinnett 1.6
Richmond
3.9
Brantley 2.6
Jeff davis 1.6
161 See Monthly Jail Reports, supra note 121. We thank Dr. Tyler Reinagel for making the
underlying data available to us in .csv format.
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Thomas
Floyd
Rabun
Burke
Seminole
Douglas
Upson
Mcintosh
Bulloch
Decatur
Bartow
Monroe
Carroll
Habersham
Walton
Haralson
Gordon
Mcduffie
Barrow
Pierce
White
Murray
Elbert
Towns
Rockdale
Whitfield
Laurens
Morgan
Meriwether

3.8
3.8
3.6
3.6
3.6
3.6
3.5
3.5
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.3
3.3
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.1
3.1
3.1
3.1
3.1
3.1
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
2.9

Appling
Liberty
Glynn
Putnam
Gilmer
Clarke
Wilkes
Jones
Bibb
Dawson
Taylor
Jasper
Lee
Calhoun
Lumpkin
Houston
Irwin
Fulton
Camden
Early
Miller
Cobb
Tattnall
Treutlen
Oglethorpe
Effingham
Toombs
Peach
Wilkinson

2.6
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.8
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Fayette
Wheeler
Coweta
Baldwin
Atkinson
Greene
Columbia
Marion
Banks
Henry
Pickens
Evans
Madison
Tift
Polk
Crawford
Union
Cook
Paulding
Forsyth
Pike
Bryan
Clayton
Schley
Turner
Harris
Chattooga
Oconee
Lamar
Johnson
Washington, Wilcox, Bacon, Baker, Berrien,
Charlton, Chattahoochee, Clay, Clinch, Echols,
Glascock, Jefferson, Lanier, Long, Montgomery,
Quitman, Talbot, Taliaferro, Twiggs, Warren,
Wayne, Webster

1.6
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.3

0.0
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We note several limitations of this analysis. First, we have no
firsthand knowledge of the data-collection process. Second, the
pretrial detention rates we report here should not be conclusively
interpreted as a reflection of each county’s bail and detention
practices. Other factors may influence these rates, notably
including underlying arrest rates and the extent to which a county’s
jail houses pretrial detainees for neighboring counties that do not
have jails themselves.
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XI. APPENDIX E: SAMPLE FINANCIAL AFFIDAVITS
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Assets (Things you own) and Debts (Things you owe):
LIQUID ASSETS

AMOUNT

Cash on Hand / Bank (or available
stocks, bonds, etc)
Equity in Real Estate (value of
property less what you owe)
Equity in Personal Property (such as
value of stereo, furniture, jewelry,
etc.)
Other

DEBT

AMOUNT

Outstanding Credit Card Debt

$

Outstanding Mortgage

$

Outstanding Student Loans

$

$
$
$
$

Outstanding Car Loan

$

Do you own anything else of value?

$

Other

$

TOTAL LIQUID ASSETS

$

TOTAL OUTSTANDING DEBTS

$

If you are currently experiencing a financial hardship (including disability, debts, expenses, or loss of
income not listed above), please explain this situation in as much detail as possible:
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ ______________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
If you chose to complete this form, check ONE of the following:
___
I can read and understand English, and I have read and understand each question and instruction
on this form in completing the form, OR
___
An interpreter read to me every question and instruction on this form and my answer to every
question in __________________, a language in which I am fluent, and I understood everything, OR
___
I did not understand each question or instruction on this form, because: _____________________
_____________________________________________________________ _______________________
I swear or affirm under penalty of perjury that all of the above information is true and correct to the best
of my knowledge.
This

_________ day of
(day)

_____________________________ , ___________.
(month)
(year)

Signature:
________________________
Printed name: ________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ __________
To be completed by Glynn County Detention Center administrative staff
Person providing this affidavit to affiant/applicant:

________________________________ __________

Interpreter (if any) used (in language: _____________) __________________________________ ________
Printed Name and Title
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BAIL DETERMINATION ORDER
To be completed by the Magistrate Judge or other judicial official at time of bond determination
Having considered the foregoing affidavit of financial hardship, as well as the factors set forth in
O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(e)(2), this Court finds that (complete only (1) or (2) below):
(1)
_______ The affiant/applicant does have a financial hardship and inability to meet the standard bond amount as
set forth in the applicable bail schedule that warrants a waiver or reduction of bail, therefore, this Court orders
that (complete only one of the following):
(_____) The affiant/applicant shall be required to post a reduced bond in the amount of $__________
which the Court finds that the affiant/applicant can pay.
(_____) The affiant/applicant shall be released on an unsecured bond in the amount of $ __________ .
(_____) The affiant/applicant shall be released on recognizance without a monetary bond.
OR
(2)
_______ The affiant/applicant does not have a financial hardship and inability to meet the standard bond amount
as set forth in the applicable bail schedule that warrants a waiver or reduction of bail and therefore bail is set
pursuant to the bail schedule in the amount of $_____________ .

SO ORDERED THIS ___________ day of _________________________, _________________.

___________________________ _____________________
Judicial Officer’s Signature
Printed Name: ___________________________ ________
Title:

____________________________________
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